Podcasts
05/06/2020
Libya’s warring sides heading for stalemate, permanent division
The conflict in Libya continues to dominate headlines as it has done for much of 2020, especially since Turkey sent its troops to bolster the besieged UN-backed government in the capital Tripoli. Before the Turkish intervention, the GNA in Tripoli were on the verge of collapse in the face of an onslaught led by renegade commander Khalifa Haftar, whose LNA forces fight on behalf of the eastern-based rival government in Tobruk.
Turkish forces, backed by allied Syrian mercenaries recruited from Turkish-controlled parts of northern Syria, helped prevent the fall of Mitiga International Airport to Haftar’s men, who themselves were backed by Russian mercenaries. The Russians also brought their own mercenaries from Syria, while the UAE funded mercenaries from places like Sudan to enter the war in support of Haftar. Haftar also attracted support from the likes of France, which has grown increasingly concerned with its depleting influence in North Africa, leaving behind a void for Turkish influence to grow. Greece has also offered its backing to Haftar, as the deal signed between Turkey and Libya’s UN-backed government includes a maritime demarcation agreement between the two countries, which Greece says violates its own maritime territory. Yet, despite having all this support, Haftar’s forces were unable to complete the operation to capture Tripoli. To the contrary, the LNA are now retreating after suffering a series of defeats.
Since the GNA announced a counterattack weeks ago, the UN-backed government has seized a number of coastal towns north of Tripoli. The biggest gamechanger, however, has been the capture of the Al Watiya air base south of Tripoli. Without the air base, Haftar’s forces are unable to provide much-needed air cover for their militias fighting on the ground. Following the loss of the air base, reports came out that pro-Haftar Russian mercenaries had started leaving Libya. As Haftar’s forces started to retreat, the UN-backed government took control of the out-of-service Tripoli International Airport before finally securing Tripoli’s parameters by taking over the town of Tarhouna, Haftar’s last stronghold in the west of the country.
But, as was mentioned in Radio EastMed’s previous podcast on Libya, there are no expectations of any further eastward advance by the GNA’s forces towards Benghazi and Tobruk. If there is to be any further attacks on the LNA, it is likely to be in the south, across Libya’s sparsely populated desert. Any advance there is likely to be quick as it will meet little resistance. It would also give the GNA the leverage of controlling the most territory in Libya. However, any move towards Benghazi and Tobruk is likely to face fierce resistance and will escalate the war. Russia and Turkey, who are now the new overlords of this war, will make sure this doesn’t happen.
Shortly after the fall of the Al Watiya airbase, a number of Russian fighter jets were reportedly flown into Libya from the Russian Hmeimim airbase in Syria. This led to some reports that Russia was preparing to directly engage with Turkish troops in Libya. NATO was particularly alarmed by this development. For NATO, it’s bad enough they couldn’t evict Russia from the Mediterranean by ousting Moscow’s ally Bashar al Assad in Syria. Russia instead used the war in Syria as an opportunity to boost its presence in the region. Now, the conflict in Libya has also brought Russia’s presence to the south of the Mediterranean, directly opposite Europe.
One could argue that Russia is filling a power vacuum left behind by the US, which under President Donald Trump has shown little interest in getting involved in conflicts in the Middle East. Yet even still, the US has its limits regarding how far it is willing to allow the Russians to go. The US may have accepted the Russians have earned their spot in the Middle East, but will not accept any westward expansion towards the Atlantic and is reportedly in the process of sending troops in Tunisia. Turkey’s presence in western Libya, therefore, is expected to receive NATO backing, seeing as Turkey is a NATO member.
At the same time, although Turkey’s intervention served as a pretext for Russia to enter Libya in the first place, the overall success of Turkish-Russian cooperation in de-escalating the conflict in Syria will be taken as a model for what can be expected in Libya. The two countries may appear to be on opposing sides, but they are actually bouncing off one another. They have created a “Libya Problem” by dividing the country into two evenly matched entities locked in a frozen conflict. Each side now depends on their respected backer to remain in Libya to maintain a set power balance. Neither Turkey nor Russia are interested in controlling all of Libya, or uniting Libya. They are only interested in creating a situation that allows them to get a foothold in North Africa. They are helping each other in that respect, and Turkey is particularly confident it will get the international support it needs to implement its deals with the UN-backed Libyan government as Western countries will recognise that Turkey is the only NATO country willing to share a front line with the Russians.
This will naturally put huge pressure on France and Greece, who along with Russia have backed Haftar. France’s ties with NATO are already strained, with French President Emmanual Macron making no secret of his preference for an EU army over a trans-Atlantic alliance. France has as of late used its reputation as a champion of Europeanism to get involved in the Eastern Mediterranean with the intention of warding off Turkish ships from drilling off contested waters around Greece. What France is actually doing there, however, is trying to cut off Turkey’s sea route to Libya in order to protect its own interests there. Yet France does this under the jealous watch of Italy, which long ago earmarked Libya as its own back garden but couldn’t make itself relevant during the present-day conflict due to its bad treatment of Libyans in colonial days. France wants Turkey out of Libya, primarily because Turkish influence is growing in neighbouring Algeria, but ousting Turkey may open the door for Russia to expand. France is also struggling to find its voice in the Eastern Mediterranean, and largely depends on good ties with Cyprus, Greece and Egypt to sail its ships in the region comfortably. If it is to go its own way from NATO, France depends on this regional alliance and must therefore show itself as supporting Greece on this issue.
However, Greece may have its own allegiances tested if Turkey gets NATO’s backing in Libya. It would mean having to step back and watch Turkey usurp a swathe of sea territory that Athens argues belongs to Greece. This could push the Greeks away from the Western bloc and towards Russia. On the other hand, it may force the Greeks to sit down and negotiate with the Turks on the maritime demarcation of the Aegean. My prediction is that neither will happen. Greece will be too proud to give concessions to Turkey and will continue to raise its protests to NATO, the EU and the UN. These international bodies will outwardly condemn Turkey if only to keep Greece on their side, but will do nothing to remove Turkey from Libya. Turkey, meanwhile, will lay claim to the disputed waters off Crete, but will not make any moves to put its standing with NATO at risk. What will follow is a stalemate on all sides, with Turkey ensuring for itself safety from a naval blockade in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Radio EastMed’s Editor-in-Chief Ertan Karpazli has more.
To listen to the full podcast rounding up all the major events of May 2020 in the Eastern Mediterranean, please visit the following link: https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=dWaq9aGAdx4&t=3s
Turkish forces, backed by allied Syrian mercenaries recruited from Turkish-controlled parts of northern Syria, helped prevent the fall of Mitiga International Airport to Haftar’s men, who themselves were backed by Russian mercenaries. The Russians also brought their own mercenaries from Syria, while the UAE funded mercenaries from places like Sudan to enter the war in support of Haftar. Haftar also attracted support from the likes of France, which has grown increasingly concerned with its depleting influence in North Africa, leaving behind a void for Turkish influence to grow. Greece has also offered its backing to Haftar, as the deal signed between Turkey and Libya’s UN-backed government includes a maritime demarcation agreement between the two countries, which Greece says violates its own maritime territory. Yet, despite having all this support, Haftar’s forces were unable to complete the operation to capture Tripoli. To the contrary, the LNA are now retreating after suffering a series of defeats.
Since the GNA announced a counterattack weeks ago, the UN-backed government has seized a number of coastal towns north of Tripoli. The biggest gamechanger, however, has been the capture of the Al Watiya air base south of Tripoli. Without the air base, Haftar’s forces are unable to provide much-needed air cover for their militias fighting on the ground. Following the loss of the air base, reports came out that pro-Haftar Russian mercenaries had started leaving Libya. As Haftar’s forces started to retreat, the UN-backed government took control of the out-of-service Tripoli International Airport before finally securing Tripoli’s parameters by taking over the town of Tarhouna, Haftar’s last stronghold in the west of the country.
But, as was mentioned in Radio EastMed’s previous podcast on Libya, there are no expectations of any further eastward advance by the GNA’s forces towards Benghazi and Tobruk. If there is to be any further attacks on the LNA, it is likely to be in the south, across Libya’s sparsely populated desert. Any advance there is likely to be quick as it will meet little resistance. It would also give the GNA the leverage of controlling the most territory in Libya. However, any move towards Benghazi and Tobruk is likely to face fierce resistance and will escalate the war. Russia and Turkey, who are now the new overlords of this war, will make sure this doesn’t happen.
Shortly after the fall of the Al Watiya airbase, a number of Russian fighter jets were reportedly flown into Libya from the Russian Hmeimim airbase in Syria. This led to some reports that Russia was preparing to directly engage with Turkish troops in Libya. NATO was particularly alarmed by this development. For NATO, it’s bad enough they couldn’t evict Russia from the Mediterranean by ousting Moscow’s ally Bashar al Assad in Syria. Russia instead used the war in Syria as an opportunity to boost its presence in the region. Now, the conflict in Libya has also brought Russia’s presence to the south of the Mediterranean, directly opposite Europe.
One could argue that Russia is filling a power vacuum left behind by the US, which under President Donald Trump has shown little interest in getting involved in conflicts in the Middle East. Yet even still, the US has its limits regarding how far it is willing to allow the Russians to go. The US may have accepted the Russians have earned their spot in the Middle East, but will not accept any westward expansion towards the Atlantic and is reportedly in the process of sending troops in Tunisia. Turkey’s presence in western Libya, therefore, is expected to receive NATO backing, seeing as Turkey is a NATO member.
At the same time, although Turkey’s intervention served as a pretext for Russia to enter Libya in the first place, the overall success of Turkish-Russian cooperation in de-escalating the conflict in Syria will be taken as a model for what can be expected in Libya. The two countries may appear to be on opposing sides, but they are actually bouncing off one another. They have created a “Libya Problem” by dividing the country into two evenly matched entities locked in a frozen conflict. Each side now depends on their respected backer to remain in Libya to maintain a set power balance. Neither Turkey nor Russia are interested in controlling all of Libya, or uniting Libya. They are only interested in creating a situation that allows them to get a foothold in North Africa. They are helping each other in that respect, and Turkey is particularly confident it will get the international support it needs to implement its deals with the UN-backed Libyan government as Western countries will recognise that Turkey is the only NATO country willing to share a front line with the Russians.
This will naturally put huge pressure on France and Greece, who along with Russia have backed Haftar. France’s ties with NATO are already strained, with French President Emmanual Macron making no secret of his preference for an EU army over a trans-Atlantic alliance. France has as of late used its reputation as a champion of Europeanism to get involved in the Eastern Mediterranean with the intention of warding off Turkish ships from drilling off contested waters around Greece. What France is actually doing there, however, is trying to cut off Turkey’s sea route to Libya in order to protect its own interests there. Yet France does this under the jealous watch of Italy, which long ago earmarked Libya as its own back garden but couldn’t make itself relevant during the present-day conflict due to its bad treatment of Libyans in colonial days. France wants Turkey out of Libya, primarily because Turkish influence is growing in neighbouring Algeria, but ousting Turkey may open the door for Russia to expand. France is also struggling to find its voice in the Eastern Mediterranean, and largely depends on good ties with Cyprus, Greece and Egypt to sail its ships in the region comfortably. If it is to go its own way from NATO, France depends on this regional alliance and must therefore show itself as supporting Greece on this issue.
However, Greece may have its own allegiances tested if Turkey gets NATO’s backing in Libya. It would mean having to step back and watch Turkey usurp a swathe of sea territory that Athens argues belongs to Greece. This could push the Greeks away from the Western bloc and towards Russia. On the other hand, it may force the Greeks to sit down and negotiate with the Turks on the maritime demarcation of the Aegean. My prediction is that neither will happen. Greece will be too proud to give concessions to Turkey and will continue to raise its protests to NATO, the EU and the UN. These international bodies will outwardly condemn Turkey if only to keep Greece on their side, but will do nothing to remove Turkey from Libya. Turkey, meanwhile, will lay claim to the disputed waters off Crete, but will not make any moves to put its standing with NATO at risk. What will follow is a stalemate on all sides, with Turkey ensuring for itself safety from a naval blockade in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Radio EastMed’s Editor-in-Chief Ertan Karpazli has more.
To listen to the full podcast rounding up all the major events of May 2020 in the Eastern Mediterranean, please visit the following link: https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=dWaq9aGAdx4&t=3s
