Podcasts
05/03/2020
Assad returning to Baathist roots amid evolving roles in Syria’s civil conflict
Syrian regime leader Bashar al Assad received and welcomed a delegation sent from Libya’s eastern-based government in which both sides signed a Memorandum of Understanding to establish diplomatic missions and cooperate against “Turkish aggression”. There’s no love lost for Assad among other Arab countries, who throughout Syria’s civil conflict have seen Assad, a member of Shia Islam’s minority Alawite sect, as a puppet of Iran.
The narrative of the conflict has evolved a number of times since it broke out with the Arab Spring in 2011. At first the uprising against the Assad regime was interpreted as a democratic revolution pitting the Syrian masses against a corrupt dictatorship. But when Assad started releasing Islamist prisoners in 2012, the Syrian opposition started taking on more of a jihadist character, which made minority groups who originally supported the revolution grow weary of what to them seemed to be a bid by the Sunni Muslim majority of Syria to subject them to another version of dictatorship. Not only did the Alawites, Armenians and Greek Orthodox communities start viewing Assad as the better of the two options, but the international community became increasingly reluctant to back the Syrian opposition which by that point appeared to harbour elements with sympathies for terrorist groups like Al Qaeda.
The West instead got behind the Syrian Kurdish YPG, an offshoot of the PKK in Turkey. Despite the PKK being registered as a terrorist group by the EU and NATO, particularly for its terror attacks in NATO ally Turkey and narcoterrorism offences in Europe, the West justified its support for the YPG by arguing it was separate to the PKK, ignoring well-recorded evidence which proves the contrary. But with the emergence of ISIS, which began to eclipse the moderate Syrian opposition, the West fell for the YPG’s lip service to democratic pluralism. There was still one problem, however. The YPG were still unapologetically Marxist-Leninist by ideology. During the Cold War-era, supporting such a group would have been a big no-no for the US. But the West’s arch-rival, Russia, which has emerged from the ashes of the old Soviet Union, no longer propagates that ideology. That being said, sympathies between the PKK and Russia still exist. So the US needed to develop the YPG into a group that would gain support within Washington and neighbouring Turkey. In came the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a mixed militia including Arab, Kurdish, Turkmen and Assyrian brigades that would take control of Syria’s oil-rich regions east of the Euphrates.
Turkey wasn’t fooled, as the leadership of the SDF was still made up of YPG members. The US failed in getting the SDF to drop its Marxist-Leninist image, and it was becoming increasingly clear in Washington that they couldn’t entirely trust the SDF. The moment the US announced it was pulling out of Syria, the SDF agreed terms with the Assad regime to work together to counter Turkish military incursions into northern Syria. Being that Assad was traditionally a Baathist, or an Arab national socialist, this agreement with the SDF seemed the natural thing to do. Except this time there is a difference.
Before the Syrian civil war, Syria’s 200,000 Kurds were refused Syrian citizenship because of the threat they posed to the Arab make-up of Syria’s national identity. Early on in the war, Assad offered them citizenship in an attempt to bribe them over to his side. Years later, this seems to have paid off. This new united scoailst front now has the advantage in Syria, but for it to continue working after the war is over, Assad will have to give concessions. Having done all the fighting east of the Euphrates, the SDF is unlikely to just step aside for Assad completely. They will probably demand autonomy under a reformed Syria made up of several federal zones. Assad may also have to play down the Arab part of Syria’s national identity to make it more pluralistic.
This settles well for Russia and Iran, who will see their respective Orthodox and Alawite proxies in Syria boosted while the Sunni Muslim Arab majority are further disenfranchised. With millions of Syrians now abroad as refugees, the Sunni Muslim Arab majority have particularly suffered a demographic setback which will favour minority groups. Even the Syrian opposition is undergoing a change, with Saudi Arabia seemingly promoting Nibras al Fadel, an Alawite and former adviser to Bashar al Assad, to become the new head of the High Negotiations Committee - all in the name of pushing pro-Turkish elements within the Syrian opposition aside.
Nonetheless, soon we may see a situation where even a large bulk of Sunni Muslim supporters of the Syrian opposition get behind Assad as he attempts to reinvent himself as a Syrian leader instead of an Iranian puppet. The deal with Libya’s eastern government will serve to help him regain legitimacy among other Arab states, particularly with Saudi Arabia which openly supports the eastern Libyan government. Continued Israeli airstrikes on Syrian soil also help restore Assad’s image as a national hero, or at very least a highly misunderstood villain.
Radio EastMed’s Editor-in-Chief Ertan Karpazli has more.
To listen to the full podcast rounding up all the major events of February 2020 in the Eastern Mediterranean, please visit the following link: https://youtu.be/fXTJli_iW6g
The narrative of the conflict has evolved a number of times since it broke out with the Arab Spring in 2011. At first the uprising against the Assad regime was interpreted as a democratic revolution pitting the Syrian masses against a corrupt dictatorship. But when Assad started releasing Islamist prisoners in 2012, the Syrian opposition started taking on more of a jihadist character, which made minority groups who originally supported the revolution grow weary of what to them seemed to be a bid by the Sunni Muslim majority of Syria to subject them to another version of dictatorship. Not only did the Alawites, Armenians and Greek Orthodox communities start viewing Assad as the better of the two options, but the international community became increasingly reluctant to back the Syrian opposition which by that point appeared to harbour elements with sympathies for terrorist groups like Al Qaeda.
The West instead got behind the Syrian Kurdish YPG, an offshoot of the PKK in Turkey. Despite the PKK being registered as a terrorist group by the EU and NATO, particularly for its terror attacks in NATO ally Turkey and narcoterrorism offences in Europe, the West justified its support for the YPG by arguing it was separate to the PKK, ignoring well-recorded evidence which proves the contrary. But with the emergence of ISIS, which began to eclipse the moderate Syrian opposition, the West fell for the YPG’s lip service to democratic pluralism. There was still one problem, however. The YPG were still unapologetically Marxist-Leninist by ideology. During the Cold War-era, supporting such a group would have been a big no-no for the US. But the West’s arch-rival, Russia, which has emerged from the ashes of the old Soviet Union, no longer propagates that ideology. That being said, sympathies between the PKK and Russia still exist. So the US needed to develop the YPG into a group that would gain support within Washington and neighbouring Turkey. In came the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a mixed militia including Arab, Kurdish, Turkmen and Assyrian brigades that would take control of Syria’s oil-rich regions east of the Euphrates.
Turkey wasn’t fooled, as the leadership of the SDF was still made up of YPG members. The US failed in getting the SDF to drop its Marxist-Leninist image, and it was becoming increasingly clear in Washington that they couldn’t entirely trust the SDF. The moment the US announced it was pulling out of Syria, the SDF agreed terms with the Assad regime to work together to counter Turkish military incursions into northern Syria. Being that Assad was traditionally a Baathist, or an Arab national socialist, this agreement with the SDF seemed the natural thing to do. Except this time there is a difference.
Before the Syrian civil war, Syria’s 200,000 Kurds were refused Syrian citizenship because of the threat they posed to the Arab make-up of Syria’s national identity. Early on in the war, Assad offered them citizenship in an attempt to bribe them over to his side. Years later, this seems to have paid off. This new united scoailst front now has the advantage in Syria, but for it to continue working after the war is over, Assad will have to give concessions. Having done all the fighting east of the Euphrates, the SDF is unlikely to just step aside for Assad completely. They will probably demand autonomy under a reformed Syria made up of several federal zones. Assad may also have to play down the Arab part of Syria’s national identity to make it more pluralistic.
This settles well for Russia and Iran, who will see their respective Orthodox and Alawite proxies in Syria boosted while the Sunni Muslim Arab majority are further disenfranchised. With millions of Syrians now abroad as refugees, the Sunni Muslim Arab majority have particularly suffered a demographic setback which will favour minority groups. Even the Syrian opposition is undergoing a change, with Saudi Arabia seemingly promoting Nibras al Fadel, an Alawite and former adviser to Bashar al Assad, to become the new head of the High Negotiations Committee - all in the name of pushing pro-Turkish elements within the Syrian opposition aside.
Nonetheless, soon we may see a situation where even a large bulk of Sunni Muslim supporters of the Syrian opposition get behind Assad as he attempts to reinvent himself as a Syrian leader instead of an Iranian puppet. The deal with Libya’s eastern government will serve to help him regain legitimacy among other Arab states, particularly with Saudi Arabia which openly supports the eastern Libyan government. Continued Israeli airstrikes on Syrian soil also help restore Assad’s image as a national hero, or at very least a highly misunderstood villain.
Radio EastMed’s Editor-in-Chief Ertan Karpazli has more.
To listen to the full podcast rounding up all the major events of February 2020 in the Eastern Mediterranean, please visit the following link: https://youtu.be/fXTJli_iW6g
